Iknowwhatyoudidtoday: bank foreclosure

A rather nauseating statement from a Government Accountability Office report on foreclosures:

Because they generally focus on the areas with greatest risk to the institutions they supervise, federal banking regulators had not generally examined servicers’ foreclosure practices, such as whether foreclosures are completed; however, given the ongoing mortgage crisis, they have recently placed greater emphasis on these areas.

You read that right. Bank regulators in the United States were not even looking at foreclosure practices before the media latched onto the foreclosure fraud outbreak. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Reserve acknowledged this in hearings two weeks ago, but it's still harrowing to see the degree to which mortgage banking remains totally free of oversight, even after it drove the global economy off a cliff.

The rest of the report is about banks abandoning properties instead of proceeding with a foreclosure sale. Kind of sick-- throw a family out, then just abandon the house altogether, don't even bother to sell it. The GAO says it's not happening too much, but any sane businessperson would make sure that it never happens. A simple loan modification would cut everybody's losses here, but the banks can't be bothered with that. And nobody is bothering the banks about it.

You may recall that there was a tremendous legislative battle earlier this year over the creation of a new Consumer Financial Protection Agency. The bank lobby and regulators at the Fed, the OCC and yes, even the FDIC, all argued that we didn't need it, while essentially everybody else said we did. But the existing regulatory chiefs all made essentially the same argument against the CFPA: We have several regulators who oversee consumer protection, and they're all just great at it. Creating a new agency that focused only on consumer protection would be end up destabilizing the financial system, because regulating consumer protection without looking at bank safety and soundness would jeopardize bank capital levels.

This argument was absurd at the time, most obviously because the existing regulators were simply awful. They totally failed to restrain predatory mortgage lending for nearly a full decade precisely because they considered "safety and soundess" regulation to be their only job. Safety and soundness was construed as "bank profitability"—if a bank had lots of money, it was less likely to fail. In practice, that meant regulators would allow consumer protection violations so long as they made money for the bank. With the mortgage crisis, this consumer protection failure ultimately lead to a safety and soundness catastrophe, but that's not actually very common. Usually predatory lending is very profitable, which is why banks do it.

So what happened after all the top regulators went out in public and repeatedly screamed that we absolutely can't allow them to lose their consumer protection authority? They totally ignored consumer protection regulation. Look at the excuse that bank regulators fed to the GAO (emphasis mine):

Because they generally focus on the areas with greatest risk to the institutions they supervise, federal banking regulators had not generally examined servicers’ foreclosure practices.

Translation: Even after consumer protection violations wrecked the largest banks in the country, we still don't look at consumer protection unless it actually hurts a bank's bottom line, right away, right now.

The amazing thing here is that the legal liabilities from these foreclosure abuses once again could be putting bank solvency on the line. Global economy to Elizabeth Warren: Help!

Also, the link above is to a summary of the GAO report. The full report is here.

With recent revelations of the fraudclosure scandal, and a spike in interest toward all things REO, we decided to go back to basics and present some "appendices" over why this process of excess bank inventory clearance is so important and what its implications are, especially in a world in which foreclosing has suddenly become legally impossible.

First, courtesy of UBS, an outline of the Foreclosure process:

The Foreclosure Process

The foreclosure process may vary significantly across states and even across countries, but the following description is general enough that it should be applicable to most of the US.

Delinquency and foreclosure. After a homeowner with a mortgage loan has missed three monthly payments, he or she is considered to be “90 days delinquent,” and the servicer of the mortgage (the company to which the mortgage payments are made) can initiate foreclosure proceedings.

Auction. At some point, the borrower will be asked to vacate the home, and if necessary at some later point, the borrower will be compelled to vacate the home by local authorities. The home will then go up for auction.

REO. If the auction bids do not reach a high enough level to cover the outstanding balance of the loan, the lender can take ownership of the property. Once the lender owns the property (referred to as real-estate-owned or REO), it will typically remain vacant until the lender is able to sell it.

A quick back of the envelope analysis that shows how much incremental inventory foreclosure creates:

A flow chart of the foreclosure process:

The charts below show the geographic/spatial concentration of foreclosure filings, as well as concentration of GSE in selected states:

The states where foreclosure accounts for the bulk of transactions:

A snapshot of contagion effects of foreclosure on homes in the same naighborhood:

Those who wish to dig into the fascinating topic of contagion (in foreclosures, not in default European countries), can find more info below:

As those who have been following our RealtyTrac updates know, in the last quarter the discount between a regular home sale and that in foreclosure just hit an all time record. Here is how the pricing matrix looks like by state and nationally:

And possibly the scariest chart of all: the end buyer of all the REOs, the properties that end up having the lowest salvage value, for the most part end up being acquired by the nationalized GSEs. And since the GSEs are on the US shadow balance sheet, these are simply more "assets" that collateralize US treasurys, and therefore, the US currency.

Take all the data above, and layer on top the complete confusion courtesy of the self-imposed foreclosure moratorium, and the utter confusion in the market becomes apparent.

bench craft company scam

Wednesday, December 8, 2010

bank foreclosure

No comments:

Post a Comment